accomplice

 On record, appellant’s participation in the commission of the crimes consisted of his presence at the locus criminis, and his shouting "Patayin, patayin iran amen!" (Kill them all!) during the later stage of the fatal incident. The prosecution witnesses did not see him bearing any weapon or using one to inflict any injury on the victims. He did not run away with the two other accused still at large. Thus, we are far from convinced that conspiracy existed between appellant and any of his sons. Conspiracy cannot be logically inferred from the overt acts of herein appellant. We have previously ruled that relationship or association alone is not a badge of conspiracy.22 When there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in the killing has committed the role of a principal or that of an accomplice, the court should favor the milder form of responsibility.23

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes as accomplices those who, not being included in Article 17 (which enumerates those liable as principals), cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Appellant herein had no direct part in the execution of the killing and maiming of the victims. Nothing on record shows that he had induced his two sons to go on a stabbing frenzy. The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that appellant shouted "Patayin, patayin iran amen!" after Melchor had already hacked Alejandra’s hand and after Mario gave chase to Gloria outside the house.24 Evidently, appellant’s utterances could not have been the determining cause of the commission of the crimes.25 If at all, it merely had further inflammatory effect on the accused. As such, appellant cannot be considered a principal by inducement. Neither can appellant be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. By his proven acts, appellant could be held liable only as an accomplice.

In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur:

 (1) community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

 (2) that he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and 

(3) that there be a relation between the acts and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.26 In this case, appellant’s acts of going to Gloria’s house with his sons and his encouraging shouts clearly demonstrated his concurrence in their aggressive design and lent support to their nefarious intent and afforded moral and material support to their attack against the victims. Hence, we are convinced he must be held liable as accomplice in the commission of the crimes.

May the liability of an accomplice be determined in the absence of trial of the supposed principals? In Vino v. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals,27 we held that "[t]he corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Hence, we find no legal impediment in the determination of appellant’s liabilities for the crimes committed.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery clearly attended the killing of Gloria and the maiming of Alejandra, as the two conditions for the existence of treachery are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him.28 Appellant’s sons went to Gloria’s house armed with bolos, which ensured the execution of their nefarious deed evidently without risk to themselves and without affording their victims any real chance to defend themselves.29 The killing of Gloria having been attended by treachery, it is without doubt murder.1âwphi1

As to Alejandra, the crime committed was frustrated murder because Melchor performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will.30 The numerous wounds inflicted on Alejandra displayed the clear intent to kill. She was hacked on the right wrist, the palm, lower wrist, fingers, and her head.31 These wounds would have caused her death had there been no timely medical intervention.32 Melchor desisted from further assault when the gravely wounded Alejandra feigned death. He then turned to Gloria believing that he had already killed Alejandra.33 Thus, the crime committed against Alejandra was frustrated murder.

While both Melchor and Mario were armed with bolos, the two victims, who were women, were not armed. Hence, abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the information, attended the commission of the crime. But treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength so the same need not be appreciated separately.34 However, the elements of evident premeditation in the commission of the offenses charged and the pertinence of dwelling in regard to appellant’s participation were not sufficiently proven.

Appellant should therefore be found guilty as an accomplice in the crimes of frustrated murder and murder.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the death penalty law, is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for an accomplice in murder is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.35 One degree lower would be reclusion temporal.36 There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal medium, and the minimum of the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor.

The penalty for an accomplice in frustrated murder is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony.37 In effect, the penalty for an accomplice in the crime of frustrated murder is two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which after applying the rules on graduating penalties, would be prision mayor.38 Considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.39 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty should be taken from prision mayor medium and the minimum thereof taken within the range of prision correccional.


EN BANC

G.R. No. 123176               October 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR RAFAEL y LEGASPI, MARIO RAFAEL y LEGASPI, and MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused,
MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused-appellant.

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