generic v.special aggravating circumstances

 Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.60 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.61 It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.62 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying."65 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused."66 Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance.67 This interpretation is erroneous since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

As was previously established, a special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.69

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