violation of domicile

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014 ]

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL ALIAS “TAPOL”, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision^[1] dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution^[2] dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision^[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.

Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias “Tapol” were charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).^[4] The Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:

The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL Alias “TAPOL” of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:

That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons in authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[5]

During the arraignment on November 5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.^[6] Thereafter, trial ensued.

Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun.

Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated his testimony.

Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.^[7] Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days.^[8]

For the defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving foot patrol, together with other barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi^[9] from three unidentified persons who managed to escape.

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:

The prosecution who has that onus probandi failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they were in fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favor of the accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; x x x.^[10]

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convicted for Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.^[11]

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.

We deny.

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.^[12] When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate.^[13] An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.^[14] The appellate court may, and generally does, look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.^[15]

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.^[16]

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence Law^[17] requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.

On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias “Tapol” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring; rollo, pp. 25-36.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[3] Penned by Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano (Records, pp. 326-332; id. at 17-23).

^[4] Art. 128. Violation of domicile. – The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

^[5] Records, p. 31.

^[6] Id. at 36.

^[7] Records, p. 4.

^[8] TSN, December 7, 1993, p. 4. (Id. at 140).

^[9] Spelled as “Pungasi” is some parts of the Records (See records, pp. 318-319).

^[10] Records, p. 331; Rollo, p. 22.

^[11] Rollo, pp. 35-36.

^[12] People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

^[13] People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

^[14] Garces v. People, 554 Phil. 683, 696-697 (2007).

^[15] People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 548, 554.

^[16] The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. It was composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals. (See People v. Flores, 410 Phil. 578, 587 [2001]).

^[17] Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 64349, May 27, 1988 ]

CARLOS CARPIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioner Carlos Carpio seeks reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony, of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

The indictment upon which he was arraigned and tried stated that “on or about March 13, 1982, in the City of Manila, ** (Carpio,) being then the Barangay Chairman of Barrio Slip. Zero, Kagitingan Extension, Tondo, ** and therefore a public officer, while in the performance of, and in relation to his official duties as such, without any justifiable order, did ** enter and conduct illegal search inside the dwelling of Corazon Abalos y Masaca located at 971 Kagitingan Ext., Tondo, ** by forcing his way in purportedly looking for a certain 'Mundong' against the will and without the previous consent of Corazon Abalos y Masaca."

The record discloses the testimony of the complaining witness, the aforesaid Corazon Abalos, to the effect that in the morning of March 13, 1982, Barangay Chairman Carpio had indeed gone to the house where she and her husband, Reynaldo Abalos (alias "Long Hair") were residing. According to her, Carpio entered her residence unannounced and without any warrant, and looked around for a certain "Mundong," staying in the house for five minutes or so. She gave no reason why Carpio was searching for Mundong.^[1]

The record reveals, too, that Corazon Abalos' complaint against Carpio was not filed until after certain occurrences had taken place. These occurrences are summarized in the Solicitor General's brief as follows:

"(O)n March 14, 1982, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, ** (Carpio) was summoned in his house at 923 Kagitingan Extension ** by the residents who were playing basketball in a nearby basketball court (TSN, Dec. 21, 1982, p. 31). The latter informed him that one Reynaldo Abalos a.k.a. 'Long Hair,' husband of complainant Corazon Abalos, was brandishing his bolo in public (TSN, id., p. 32). As petitioner went out of his house, he saw Abalos in a small alley, by the makeshift basketball court, about 6 to 7 meters away from him, making a show out of his bolo **. In the performance of his duty to preserve peace in the area as barangay chairman, petitioner admonished Reynaldo Abalos of the consequences of his actions and the ** danger that the same may cause the bystanders and the public. Abalos merely responded by looking at petitioner without a word and walked towards his own house (TSN, id., p. 33).

"As petitioner pursued Abalos, he saw complainant Abalos, complainant's cousin, Victor Aglinao, and 20 other persons armed with bladed weapons, pipes and bolos, blocking his way (TSN, id., pp. 34 and 36). Compelled to save his life and limb, petitioner cried for help, and immediately some residents went to his succor and accompanied him home safely (TSN, id., p. 36).

"Unable to retaliate physically on the person of petitioner for the previous incident wherein petitioner publicly reprimanded him, Abalos and company (one Mundo, Victor Aglinao **, Boy Kulot and others), abetted by one Patrolman Enrico Cruz, proceeded to petitioner's house, destroyed his store with the use of a crowbar, and hacked his house, with petitioner trembling with fear inside". The group threatened to kill petitioner as Patrolman Cruz watched. After ten (10) minutes, and petitioner's house destroyed, the group left.

"Thereafter, residents of the Barangay Slip Zero sought the assistance of one Patrolman Rodolfo Perez, assigned as Officer-in-Charge of Desk II, Western Police District at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon (Exhibit "1", TSN, id., p. 4).

"Accompanied by Sgt. Rodolfo Perez and his men, petitioner went to the house of complainant to arrest her husband, Reynaldo Abalos and the others responsible for destroying the house of the former (TSN, id., p. 42).

"Complainant Corazon Abalos, who was found therein refused petitioner and the other peace officers entry to the house, and instead uttered defamatory words **.

“Unable to arrest Reynaldo Abalos and company, petitioner together with Sgt. Perez and company, proceeded to the police station to enter the same at the police blotter and at the same time sought police protection against the former (TSN, id., p. 44).”

The aforementioned Pat. Enrico Cruz is the brother-in-law of Corazon Abalos. For his part in the "raid" and the destruction of the store and house of Carpio, an administrative complaint was filed by the latter against him with the NAPOLCOM for grave misconduct.

It was after these events on the fourteenth of March had transpired, and an administrative complaint for grave misconduct had been filed with the NAPOLCOM against her brother-in-law, Pat. Cruz, that, to repeat, Corazon Abalos presented her own complaint against petitioner Carpio for violation of domicile. Parenthetically, a similar complaint was also filed against Carpio by Oscar Aglinao, brother of one of the "raiders” (Victor Aglinao), but Carpio's prosecution therefor resulted in his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan.^[2]

The Sandiganbayan however found Carpio guilty of the charge preferred by Corazon Abalos. In convicting Carpio, the Sandiganbayan relied on Corazon's sole testimony; and that testimony referred to Carpio's alleged criminal intrusion into Corazon's residence on the 13th of March, a day before the occurrence of the events giving rise to the cause to look for and arrest her husband and/or his companions.

No persuasive reason is given by the Trial Court for disregarding the facts on record, established by the evidence of the defense. This is surprising specially in the light of the Lower Court's observations in its decision respecting corroboration of Carpio's evidence by Sgt. Rodolfo Perez, who has not been shown to be other than a neutral witness, having no motive to falsify his testimony.^[3] According to the Sandiganbayan ^[4]

"Sgt. Rodolfo Perez corroborated the testimony of accused that he responded to a call for police assistance at Barrio Slip Zero ** and there, upon arrival, he found that a riot was in progress. He also saw the damage caused on the house of the accused, which the latter claimed were the handiwork of a certain Mundong and other persons. When he asked the accused where they can find said Mundong, he was led to the place of Corazon Abalos. There he saw Pat. Cruz in front of Corazon's house, who told him, in answer to his inquiry to that effect, that Mundong had already left the place. They did not enter the house of Corazon Abalos. Instead he advised the accused to lodge a complaint in Station 2."

A conviction may, to be sure, be made to rest on the testimony of a single witness, provided he appears otherwise trustworthy and, reliable.^[5] Corazon Abalos cannot however be so characterized as a witness. Not only is her evidence belied by the proofs of the defense, inclusive of the testimony of impartial, objective persons, it also makes no sense, since it describes a search for a friend of her husband and an illegal entry into her house for that precise purpose by the barangay chairman, who had no conceivable reason for doing so on that day.

Rejection of Corazon's testimony is thus called for. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to consider her accusation a concocted one, designed "to counteract the petitioner's complaint against Pat. Enrico Cruz"^[6] in the NAPOLCOM considering that, as the Solicitor General points out, "she and her husband rely for subsistence and support" on said Pat. Cruz.^[7]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another entered ACQUITTING petitioner Carlos Carpio of the offense charged.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (C.J.,) Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

^[1] TSN, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. 7-10

^[2] Judgment in Criminal Case No. 6899, promulgated on Nov. 16, 1983

^[3] SEE Peo. v. Aleman, 102 SCRA 785; Peo. v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321; Peo. v. Blas, 106 SCRA 305; Peo. v. Aposaga, 108 SCRA 574; Peo. v. Clarin, 108 SCRA 684

^[4] Decision, Crim. Case No. 6487, p. 6

^[5] Peo. v. Naba-unag, 79 SCRA 33; Peo. v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508

^[6] Petition, p. 6

^[7] Comments, p. 8

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 130442, April 06, 2000 ]

THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review by way of Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals ^[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 43872, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Director (RD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Iloilo City, through its Summary Dismissal Board (SDB), suspending herein respondent C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita from the service for twenty (20) days for "Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty under Section 41 of R. A. 6975."

The antecedents are as follows:

On July 6, 1994, the following verified complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario:

1)	Administrative Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-01- for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Jesus H. Puey in a complaint dated June 25, 1994;
2)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-02- for Grave Threats filed by Jesus H. Puey;
3)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-03 for Abuse of Authority and Illegal Search filed by Jesus H. Puey;
4)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-04 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile filed by Jesus H. Puey;
5)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-05 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Jesus H. Puey;
6)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-06 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Manuel H. Puey;
7)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-07 for Illegal Search filed by Manuel H. Puey;
8)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-08 for Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile filed by Manuel Puey;
9)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-09 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Manuel Puey;
10)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-10 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
11)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-11 for Abuse of Authority and Grave Threats filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
12)	Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" 94-12 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario.

The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975 ^[2]. The statement of the case by the Summary Dismissal Board is as follows:

"That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday party of Miss Jessie Vasquez Alex Edwin del Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristita Dawa boarded Mazda pick up with plate nr. HHP-808 and driven by Reynaldo Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City.

While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, the aforementioned Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro Torcita; That on board the motor vehicle driven by Torcita were three females sitted at the back;

That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda pick-up to stop, however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the signal and instead accelerated and proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping.

That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was approached by two persons in civilian clothes which prevented him from further proceeding; Moments after, the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major Torcita, approached Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the identity of the persons who accosted him;

The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very, very loud voice, invectives and remarks;

That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect;

In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while admitting that he entered the premises of the complainants, the same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a crime in his presence;

From the affidavits of the witnesses and testimonies presented by the complainants and the counter affidavits and the counter testimonies of the respondent, the ISSUE before the Board is whether the respondent is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer under Republic Act 6975 as implemented by Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the National Police Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed thru a series of illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban."

The complainant presented documentary evidence and witnesses Congressman Manuel Puey, Rosita Bistal, Alex Edwin del Rosario and Reynaldo Consejo. Respondent Torcita testified in his behalf and presented Nehru Java, a member of the PNP Cadiz, who was with him during the incident in question.

The Summary Dismissal Board made the following findings of facts:

"That sometime last April 26, 1994, at about 10:30 in the evening, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H. Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a mazda pick-up, in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, about 10 kilometers from crossing Cadiz, owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, the executive assistant and financial analyst of Congressman Puey, three (3) helpers employed under the Congressman, namely, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa;

That both parties came from the Municipality of Victorias where they attended some social functions on the occasion of the town fiesta;

After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by Congressman Manuel Puey; The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey, occurred;

The Complainant tried to establish the fact that nothing unusual occurred or transpired between the parties in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig and that Torcita has no business pursuing them; However the Board is more inclined to give credence to the affidavits (exhibit 5 & 6) and the testimony of C/Insp. Torcita that a vehicular collision almost took place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up;

That it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways of the country (exhibit 13); This observation is further bolstered by the testimony of Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the mazda pick-up, that he was able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit the shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed (tsn page 131, August 30, 1994 );

This sudden increase in speed of a driver involved in a vehicular accident is a classic move for one who wants a fast get away from the scene, to escape responsibility;

Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching Hda. Aimee, he instructed the guard to be on look-out for a car might be following them and might enter the compound (TSN page 70 August 30, 1994 ). This conduct would show that witness is anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which could have ended in a vehicular collision and finally no proof was presented to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita would pursue the Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of a vehicular collision;

The Complainant presented the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo and the Affidavit of Alex Edwin del Rosario, jointly taken, may be considered as proof that C/Insp. Torcita has committed act or series of acts that would constitute Grave Threat, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Resolutions regarding the gun ban, thus CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER;

That in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo (exhibit c; exhibit 2), Bistal attempted to establish the fact that C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered the gate of the compound but were stopped by the guards armed with cane stick or batuta, however in her testimony given during the hearing (tsn page 32, August 30, 1994) she stated that she did not know what transpired between the two men approaching and the guards near the gate because she, together with her companions, were busy unloading kitchen utensil from the pick-up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this portion of their affidavit, specifically paragraph 7, is NOT TRUE; Alex Edwin del Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing, corroborated this fact that he also did not see or hear what happened for he was in some distance away and he cannot see them clearly (TSN page 73, August 30, 1994 );

The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened near the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony given in the hearing of the case that when he was walking towards the compound together with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, two armed civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He identified himself however, the same had no effect, and PO2 Java whispered that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up; Since no proof to the contrary was presented by the Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses presented to rebut this allegations, the Board had no other choice except to consider these allegations as proof; (Exhibit 5 & 6); The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan newspaper with nationwide circulation and with unquestionable credential, had published a news item about the presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey exhibit 14); This evidence give more credence to the fact that there were really armed men in the premises where the aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated further by the affidavit of PO2 Nehru Java (exhibit 17);

This observation of the Board that there were really armed men in the premises of Hda. Aimee, is further enhance by the fact that Major Torcita felt their presence when he desisted from further entering the compound, a feeling which was developed and nurtured by years of living under combat conditions and finally the Board also feels that the presence of armed persons in the offices and properties of high government officials is accepted as a necessary consequence for their protection due to the greater risks they are expose to;

That because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which was further aggravated by the confrontation near the gate of the compound of Hda. Aimee, C/Insp. Torcita upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were; This fact is not disputed by the parties;

xxx......xxx......xxx

Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to the point of drunkness; The Board is more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane person will risks the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving when he is mentally and physically incapable; Further, C/Insp. Torcita was able to drive from Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance of forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and was able to avoid collision of the vehicles involved by sheer reflex action despite the admitted fact that his tire hit the shoulder of the road;

Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the compound he was fully aware of the presence of armed men and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching the compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show that C/Insp. Torcita was in full command of his senses and was not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a drunk person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly."

The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The Board also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties when the incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Board reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint for CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER under Memo Cir. Nr. 92-006 pursuant to Sec. 42, RA 6975, be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence, however finds C/Insp. Lazaro R. Torcita to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY under Sec. 41, RA 6975, in relation to NAPOLCOM Memo Cir. Nr. 91-002 and is hereby ORDERED SUSPENDED for twenty days (20) and forfeiture of salary for the same period of time effective upon receipt of this Decision under Rule 7, Section 2, Sub-par. b of the same Memo Circular."

Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Thus,

"Under the applicable provisions of Section 45 of R. A. 6975, however, the disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director upon a PNP member shall be final and executory except those involving demotion in rank or dismissal from the service. The appealed decision being that of suspension from the service with corresponding forfeiture of pay only the same is not subject to review by this Board." ^[3]

Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law."

Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The regional trial court granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty.

Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the regional trial court, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that "the twelve (12) cases treated as Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed."

The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:

"1.	THE OFFENSE OF "SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY" IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE CHARGE OF "CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER."
2.	THE DECISION OF THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD (SDB) AND THE NAPOLCOM REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY." ^[4]

The petitioners submit that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer" is broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act which brings such disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law. Moreover, the dismissal has become final and executory and the trial court erred when it proceeded with the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

In his comment, respondent Torcita insists that his right to due process of law was "corrosively abridged and impaired", and pleads for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The appeal has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court granting the petition for certiorari.

The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against any member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is laid down in Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990." This law defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer." ^[5] Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule II, as follows:

"Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization."

On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty" are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2.A, Rule VI)

As above-stated, the Summary Dismissal Board absolved the C/Insp. Torcita of the consolidated charge of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" but found him guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty under Sec. 41, R.A. No. 6975, in relation to Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and imposed a penalty of suspension for twenty (20) days and forfeiture of salary for the same period.

We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the definition of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" as earlier granted, is broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and that there is "no legal prohibition" which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from finding petitioner guilty of the lesser offense. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all- encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.

The series of twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, wherein Torcita, who was off-duty and was in civilian clothes, riding in his private vehicle with members of his family, chased another vehicle which overtook his car in a reckless manner and in violation of the Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda Aimee, where he allegedly entered the place without lawful warrant and while inside, belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, pointed his gun at somebody and urinated in full view of the persons therein. The Dismissal Board found the above charges unsubstantiated and held that Torcita was in the performance of official duty when the incidents happened. "However, he committed breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same."

It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer." Thus, the Board defined the issue before the Board as "whether the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Republic Act 6975, as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 of the National Police Commission under Rule II, Section 3, Paragraph c, committed though a series of illegal acts consisting of grave threats, illegal search, abuse of authority, violation of domicile or violation of Comelec Gunban." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. AcctÃ¤ mis

The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained. (Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006). However, notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).

It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454 ). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident, the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never acquires finality (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

^[1] Seventeenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Angelina-Sandoval-Gutierrez as Chairman, Bernardo LL. Salas, (ponente), and Omar U. Amin; Rollo, 31-47.
^[2] "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for other purposes" otherwise known as the "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990".
^[3] Order dated January 16, 1995.
^[4] Rollo, p. 15.
^[5] "Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. The Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the following cases:

a.	When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
b.	When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and
c.	When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer."

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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004 ]

ELI LUI AND LEO ROJAS, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES EULOGIO AND PAULINA MATILLANO, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21.^[2]

The Antecedents

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his father’s older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2, 1988, Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.

Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging. There were occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.

On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiao’s house.

On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousin’s place, at Quimpo Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00.

On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina, Davao City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancy’s house and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988.

That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.

At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed, they borrowed Lui’s Ford Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.

After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with him. Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Lui’s vehicle. The car stopped in front of Lui’s house, where the latter alighted and went inside, while his companions and Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The group went to Ben’s house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas “to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.

In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Lui’s companions took his picture. Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriend’s parents at New Matina, Davao City. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.

Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Lui’s companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.

Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosa’s aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosa’s sister, Paulina’s daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latter’s sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, “Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something.” Paulina remonstrated, “Why are you meddling (manghilabot)?”

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might happen. He then said, “All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something.” Paulina told Lui to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies’ shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the latter’s children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his two companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room, one of Lui’s companions recognized her as Lariosa’s sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them as they left the house.

Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she was on the verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulina’s stomach. However, Erlinda had to leave because she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared hot water and put a soothing ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.

In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused an entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following items from the Matillano residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing P290.00; a pair of black ladies’ shoes worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies’ shoes worth P69.00.

At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as policemen had gained entry into their house and took the following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one ring; and old coins.^[3]

At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier that day, at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies’ shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old coins, without his and his wife’s consent and without a search warrant.^[4] In the meantime, Doroteo Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168.^[5]

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies’ shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.^[6]

On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.^[7] The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosa’s confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.^[8] The trial court, likewise, found that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:

What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this charged against the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in the record, as indicating the fear of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against him in the Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment, without any sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended to support complainant’s ground against any possible complaint, the accused might file against him with the Department of Labor by way of anticipation.^[9]

On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:

Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one Eulogio Matillano, accused’s uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits “H,” “I,” “J,” “K,” “L,” and “M,” consisting of Sony Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes; and Seiko Actus wristwatch.^[10]

Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. Upon reinvestigation, however, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989, recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office for possible administrative sanctions against Rojas.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is a member of the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against him pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever action it may take.^[11]

The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police Commission, thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability for the complainant’s failure to substantiate the charges.^[12] The Commission held that Rojas was merely complying with the mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui and the latter’s two companions to the Matillano residence.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III dismissed the petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutor’s resolution filed by Paulina Matillano. The Secretary of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.

In a parallel development, Lariosa’s parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al., with the Commission of Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is sufficient prima facie evidence:

1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and

2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as defined under Art. 128 of the same code.^[13]

The Proceedings in the Trial Court

On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the following:

3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community;

4. That at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband was away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there tending the house, defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after which they brought with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old coins, without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items taken;

5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the herein plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;

6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the house of plaintiffs and then taking with them the items mentioned above without even the benefit of any receipt is not only violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of Article 32 of the Civil Code;

7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental anguishes, wounded feelings, deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and fright for which reason defendants should be made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;

8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or correction for the public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and severally exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00;

9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel for an agreed attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of P1,000.00 per court appearance;

10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less than P10,000.00;^[14]

They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:

1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;

4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;

5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.^[15]

In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did not conduct a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the house and even brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were brought out by Lariosa’s sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes, and one (1) pair of blue pants.^[16]

The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter their house, and with Lariosa’s sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the complaint. They testified that no violence, threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina Matillano. Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely complying with the Mission Order issued to him when he entered the house of the plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants, and that he remained in the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the goods from plaintiff Matillano in the second floor of the house.

On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them. The trial court took into account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as the order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.

The Case on Appeal

The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the appellants contended, thus:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA MATILLANO VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW ELINITO LARIOSA WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA MATILLANO WAS THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE BANSALAN POLICE STATION.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS – APPELLEES.^[17]

On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally:

1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorney’s fees; and

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.^[18]

The appellate court denied the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.

Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-HONORED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE AND DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT TRIED THE CASE;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANO’S RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.^[19]

The Issues

The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners’ liability to the respondents.

Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and resolve them simultaneously.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of some exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are determinative of the outcome of the petition.^[20]

The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding the factual findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court, the petitioners assert that the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral. Lui did not conduct any search in the second floor of the respondent’s house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter. According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove that they forced their way into the house of the respondents, and that the facts and circumstances which the appellate court found the trial court to have overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate court failed to discern that the action filed by the respondents with the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery against Lariosa, the respondents’ nephew.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the evidence of the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the appellate court found that the trial court had overlooked facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would have altered the court’s decision. The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.^[21]

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:

	ATTY. SUARIO:
	Q	Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?
	A	I know him.

	Q	Why do you know Eli Lui?
	A	Because he is from Bansalan.

	Q	On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?
	A	I was in our house.

	Q	At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any unusual incident that took place in your house?
	A	There was.

	Q	What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?
	A	There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.

	Q	Where did they enter?
	A	They entered through the kitchen.

	Q	Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
	A	I was in our sala.

	Q	Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?
	A	I was afraid.

	Q	Aside from fear, what did you do?
	A	One of them suddenly said, “Mrs., we are authorities.”

	ATTY. TAN:
		Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.

	ATTY. SUARIO:
		She is responding the question because my question is, “Aside from fear, what did you do?” and according to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of those who entered…(not continued)

	COURT:
		I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.

	ATTY. SUARIO:
	Q	What did these persons do when they entered your house?
	A	One of them said, “Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your house."

	Q	Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons in authority?
	A	That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic) him later to be Leo Rojas.

	Q	Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?
	A	When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.

	Q	What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?
	A	He was in civilian clothes.

	Q	Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?
	A	Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them in the name of Elinito Lariosa.

	Q	Who else, Mrs. Matillano?
	A	Eli Lui.

	…

	ATTY. SUARIO:
		At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word “manghilabot” be incorporated.

	COURT:
		So, the word is “interfering” or “meddling.” You record the word “manghilabot.”

	ATTY. SUARIO:
	Q	When you said “manghilabot,” what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?
	A	Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they doing that (manghilabot)?

	Q	When you said those remarks, what else happened?
	A	It was Eli Lui who answered, “Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might happen.” (Basig madisgrasya).

	ATTY. SUARIO:
		“Madisgrasya,” Your Honor, is more than something.

	ATTY. SUARIO:
	Q	When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
	A	He said, “All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something.” And I even told him that we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they said they are in a hurry.

	Q	And after that, what else happened?
	A	I accompanied him upstairs.

	Q	You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied upstairs.
	A	Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.

	Q	These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?
	A	Yes, sir.^[22]

	…

	ATTY. TAN:
	Q	Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When you said suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?
	A	They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.

	Q	You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?
	A	They did not.

	Q	Who first entered the house among the five (5)?
	A	What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I recognized was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.

	Q	Was your door opened at that time?
	A	It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.

	Q	But you can open it without kicking the door?
	A	Yes, sir.

	Q	Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
	A	Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?

	Q	Who were armed among the five (5)?
	A	All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.

	Q	You are very sure of that?
	A	I am very sure.^[23]

Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took her personal things, and those of her family’s, from the second floor of the house:

	Q	Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what happened upstairs?
	A	Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of leather shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and when it was already open they rummaged through it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my ring and a coinsita, old gold coins.

	Q	When you said “coinsita,” what is “coinsita”?
	A	Old coins.

	Q	After taking all of these things, what else happened?
	A	They went downstairs.^[24]

	…

	Q	Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your house, do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?
	A	Yes.

	Q	And there were also two (2) floor mats?
	A	Yes, that is true.

	Q	One (1) Bulova wristwatch?
	A	Yes.

	Q	One (1) necklace?
	A	Yes.

	Q	Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?
	A	Yes.

	Q	Two (2) pairs of pants?
	A	Yes.

	Q	One (1) ring?
	A	Yes.

	Q	Who owns these two (2) pairs of lady’s (sic) shoes?
	A	That was mine.

	Q	What were the color of the shoes?
	A	Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).

	Q	Where did you buy that shoes?
	A	In Davao City.

	Q	What store in Davao City?
	A	NCCC.

	Q	What particular date when you bought that shoes?
	A	I think it was in the month of November.

	Q	1988?
	A	1988.

	Q	And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?
	A	My children.

	Q	What are the names of your children?
	A	Allan and Danilo.

	Q	Where is Allan residing?
	A	During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.

	Q	So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?
	A	No more.

	Q	How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?
	A	He was living in Sta. Cruz.

	Q	He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?
	A	He was still single then.

	Q	But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?
	A	Yes.

	Q	How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?
	A	My children also.

	Q	You are referring to Allan and Danilo?
	A	No, because I still have so many children.

	Q	So, who owns these two (2) pants?
	A	Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.

	Q	Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?
	A	In our house.

	Q	How about these two (2) t-shirts?
	A	Also owned by my children.

	Q	Are you referring to Allan and Danilo?
	A	They used to wear that.

	Q	How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then residing in Tacloban?

	ATTY. SUARIO:
		May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.

	COURT:
		All right.

	A	They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some of their clothes inside our aparador.

	Q	These polo shirts were still new?
	A	Already used.

	Q	How about the pants?
	A	The other one is already used and the other one is new.

	Q	How about the floor mats?
	A	That is mine.

	Q	Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that correct?
	A	Yes, that is true.

	Q	Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?
	A	Many.

	Q	Could you say one (1) dozen?
	A	It cannot be counted.

	Q	Could you say three (3) dozens?
	A	It is really full of dress.

	Q	Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?
	A	More.

	Q	And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?
	A	Yes.

	Q	And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants, polo shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere taken?
	A	Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good ones.

	Q	Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?
	A	I was ordered to open the trunk.

	Q	Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?
	A	Eli Lui.^[25]

The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain^[26] and filed a complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.^[27]

The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside the house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.

The petitioners’ attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to respondent Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Lui’s state of mind before he and petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and proceeded to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:

Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having anything to do with the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the police for investigation and there without affording accused with his right to counsel, he was interrogated orally and was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to the complainant’s establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without accused again afforded the right to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment while accused was handcuffed, as shown in the pictures taken by the police.

Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A), no longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of maltreating the accused even in the presence of the guards in the jail and seriously threatening accused to admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious threatening words of accused’s companion in the jail, that if he will refuse to sign his alleged confession, he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui with the police.

Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have an open hand in the prosecution of the accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest him, even without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in the investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in a car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the establishment of complainant during the re-enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by accused out of the money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows the police despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities, gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting control over the police power of investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused.^[28]

If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police authorities, he would not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents’ house with petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, and his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would succeed. Hence, they did not coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they went to the respondents’ house with their intention to divest them of their belongings.

Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to “follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City.” The petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

ART. 128. Violation of domicile— The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the respondents’ house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence, and to arrest the persons committing such crimes.

The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following grounds: (a) she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the occupants of the respondents’ house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all women; (c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the provincial prosecutor’s resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B for robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary of Justice, and the ruling of the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.

We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.

First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently in Bansalan. He went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other businessmen.^[29] She also testified that there were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The case was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered missing.^[30] If the petitioner, a businessman for ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would, likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her personal belongings. It must be stressed that petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a police officer from Davao City.

Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the respondents’ house were all women. They must have believed that there were male occupants; hence, barged into the house with drawn guns.

Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement before the Bansalan Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life and, without any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal belongings against their will.^[31]

Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina Matillano declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the petitioners and their cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal belongings.^[32] That the report made before the Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement are not as complete as her testimony before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but they do not detract from the credibility of the witness.^[33] An entry in the police blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject.^[34] The same principle applies to entries in the barangay blotter.

Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-administrative agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,^[35] found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners because they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties from the house of the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen from his uncle, Ben.^[36] The decision of the National Police Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the petitioner was merely performing his duty as ordered by his superior officer.^[37] It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint for violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao City.^[38] In contrast, the Commission on Human Rights recommended the indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for violation of domicile.^[39]

Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of the complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions against them.

The petitioners’ contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.” This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.^[40] The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision^[41] because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.^[42]

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.^[43] There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.^[44] The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.^[45] The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.^[46] A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.^[47]

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.

Furthermore, the petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents’ house. Even if respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was only because the petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing so.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the respondents’ house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents of their belongings. The petitioners even left together after the incident.

In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,^[48] we had the occasion to state:

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.

“xxx
“(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

“xxx
“The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.”

“ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

“xxx
“(6) Illegal search;

“(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

“Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.”

xxx

“The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.” (emphasis supplied)

In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly responsible, viz:

“[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly or indirectly’ responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

xxx

“While it would certainly be too naïve to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated ‘directly’ should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations.” (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:

“Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees’ (respondents’) merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation’s instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court’s query— posed in its decision now under consideration – as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation.”

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonable seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.^[49]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Teodoro P. Regino, concurring.

^[2] Penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla.

^[3] Exhibit “A.”

^[4] Exhibit “3.”

^[5] Exhibit “B.”

^[6] Exhibit “1.”

^[7] Exhibit “E.”

^[8] Exhibit “K.”

^[9] Exhibit “K-25.”

^[10] Exhibit “L.”

^[11] Exhibit “10.”

^[12] Exhibit “18.”

^[13] Exhibit “N.”

^[14] Records, pp. 1-3.

^[15]Id. at 3.

^[16]Id. at 12-13.

^[17] CA Rollo, p. 20.

^[18] Rollo, p. 30.

^[19]Id. at 5.

^[20] Heirs of Tan Eng Kee vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740 (2000).

^[21] Rollo, pp. 24-27.

^[22] TSN, 23 September 1991, pp. 5-10.

^[23]Id. at 20-21.

^[24]Id. at 10-11.

^[25] TSN, 3 December 1991, pp. 9-12.

^[26] Exibit “A.”

^[27] Exhibit “B.”

^[28] Exhibit “K.”

^[29] TSN, 23 September 1991, p. 16.

^[30]Id. at 20.

^[31] Exhibit “4.”

^[32] Exhibit “B.”

^[33] People vs. Padilla, 213 SCRA 631 (1992).

^[34] People vs. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758 (1995).

^[35] Exhibit “13.”

^[36] Exhibit “10.”

^[37] Exhibit “18.”

^[38] Exhibit “20.”

^[39] Exhibit “H.”

^[40] MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

^[41] People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).

^[42] People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690 (2001).

^[43] Ibid.

^[44] Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 89 (1938).

^[45] People vs. Compacion, 361 SCRA 540 (2001).

^[46] Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770 (1948).

^[47] Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, supra; People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., supra.

^[48] Supra.

^[49]Id. at 234-236.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 104604, October 06, 1995 ]

NARCISO O. JAO AND BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS; COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS; COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PORT OF MANILA; COL. SINDULFO R. SEBASTIAN, DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS; AND MAJ. JAIME MAGLIPON, CHIEF, OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE STAFF, ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 111223]

NARCISO O. JAO AND BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, AND SINDULFO SEBASTIAN, JAIME MAGLIPON; JOSE YUCHONGCO; RICARDO CORONADO; VICTOR BARROS; DENNIS BANTIGUE; ROY LARA; BENJAMIN SANTOS; RODOLFO GONDA; ADONIS REJOSO; DANIEL PENAS; NICANOR BONES; ABUNDIO JUMAMOY; ARTEMIO CASTILLO; ANDRESITO ABAYON; RUBEN TAGUBA; JAIME JAVIER; HERBERT DOLLANO, ALL WITH THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS; JOVY GUTIERREZ OF THE MAKATI POLICE, AND ‘JOHN DOES,’ RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

G.R. No. 104604 is a petition for certiorari of the decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which states:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders issued by the respondent judge dated November 20, 1990, December 10, 1990, January 3, 1991 and all subsequent orders in the Civil Case No. 90-2382 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati are SET ASIDE. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the respondent judge is hereby enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382 and further, Case No. 90-2382 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 111223 is a petition for certiorari of the resolution of the Ombudsman^[2] dismissing the case filed before it by herein petitioner.

The above-docketed cases were consolidated per resolution of the Court on August 26, 1993, as the facts in both cases were the same.

These facts are the following:

On August 10, 1990, the Office of the Director, Enforcement and Security Services (ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information regarding the presence of allegedly untaxed vehicles and parts in the premises owned by a certain Pat Hao located along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and Honduras St., Makati. After conducting a surveillance of the two places, respondent Major Jaime Maglipon, Chief of Operations and Intelligence of the ESS, recommended the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention against the articles stored in the premises.

On August 13, 1990, District Collector of Customs Titus Villanueva issued the warrants of seizure and detention.

On the same date, respondent Maglipon coordinated with the local police substations to assist them in the execution of the respective warrants of seizure and detention. Thereafter, the team searched the two premises.

In Makati, they were barred from entering the place, but some members of the team were able to force themselves inside. They were able to inspect the premises and noted that some articles were present which were not included in the list contained in the warrant. Hence, on August 15, 1990, amended warrants of seizure and detention were issued by Villanueva.

On August 25, 1990, customs personnel started hauling the articles pursuant to the amended warrants. This prompted petitioners Narciso Jao and Bernardo Empeynado to file a case for Injunction and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-2382 with prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati Branch 56 on August 27, 1990 against respondents. On the same date, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

On September 7, 1990, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, claiming that it was the Bureau of Customs that had exclusive jurisdiction over it.

On November 20, 1990, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss.

On November 29, 1990, petitioners' application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction was granted conditioned upon the filing of a one million peso bond.

The Court also prohibited respondents from seizing, detaining, transporting and selling at public auction petitioners' vehicles, spare parts, accessories and other properties located at No. 2663 Honduras St., San Isidro, Makati and at No. 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Respondents were further prohibited from disturbing petitioners' constitutional and proprietary rights over their properties located at the aforesaid premises. Lastly, respondents were ordered to return the seized items and to render an accounting and inventory thereof.

On December 13, 1990, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds:

a) the lower court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, it has no recourse but to dismiss the same; and

(b) the lower court had no legal authority to issue an injunction therein.

On January 3, 1991 the motion for reconsideration was denied. Respondents then went to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss and in granting petitioners' application for preliminary injunction. They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, such jurisdiction being exclusively vested in the Bureau of Customs.

The Court of Appeals set aside the questioned orders of the trial court and enjoined it from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382. The appellate court also dismissed the said civil case.

On May 2, 1992, petitioners filed a petition with this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 104604.

As regards G.R. No. 111223, petitioners filed criminal charges against respondents, other officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police before the Office of the Ombudsman for Robbery, Violation of Domicile and Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-90-2027.

Respondent Ombudsman summarized the case before it as follows:

"This is an affidavit-complaint filed by the complainants against the respondents, Officers and Employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police allegedly for violation of Domicile and Robbery defined and penalized under Articles 128, 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of R.A. 3019 committed as follows, to wit:

That on August 11, 1990, after receiving intelligence information of the presence of smuggled goods, some of the respondents headed by Jaime Maglipon posed themselves as Meralco inspectors and entered complainants' stockyards and residence located at 2663 Honduras Street, Makati, Metro Manila and at 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Paranaque for the purpose of searching smuggled goods found therein without the consent of the owner thereof;

That after the search, respondents on August 13, 1990 up to August 25, 1990, this time clothed with a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, with the aid of the Makati Police and several heavily armed men entered complainants stockyard located at 2663 Honduras St., Makati, Metro Manila, and pulled out therefrom several machineries and truck spare parts without issuing the corresponding receipts to the complainants to cover all the items taken.

Respondents claimed in their consolidated and verified comment that they are not liable for violation of domicile because the places entered and searched by them appear not to be the residences of the complainants but only their warehouses. As proof of this allegation, the respondents presented the pictures of said warehouses, which are attached to their comment as Annexes "6", "6-A" to "6-C" and the Sheriff's return likewise attached to their verified comments as Annex "7". According to the respondents, a charge for violation of domicile may apply only if the place entered into against the will of the owner is used exclusively for dwelling. In the case at bar, the place entered into was used more of a warehouse than a dwelling place.

Further respondents also claimed not liable for robbery (sic) because the complainants appear not to be the owners of the properties taken. Moreover, the respondents claimed that the taking is lawful because the same proceeded from a warrant of Seizures and Detention; there was no violence or intimidation of person committed and that there was no intent to gain on the part of the respondents, the purpose of the seizure of the subject goods being to collect customs duties and taxes due the government.

Lastly, the respondents disclaimed liability for a violation of R.A. 3019 because they deny having demanded from the complainants the sum of P100,000.00. Instead according to the respondents, it was the complainants who offered them P70,000.00 to delay the hauling of the seized goods as attested to in the joint affidavit of CPSGT, Ricardo Coronado and Dennis Bantequi."

A preliminary investigation was conducted and on May 31, 1991, another hearing was held to give the parties a chance to submit further evidence to support their respective claims.

On March 15, 1993 respondent Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of merit.

On May 17, 1993, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was denied on July 8, 1993.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 111223, which was filed on August 16, 1993.

In G.R. No. 111223, petitioners claim that respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case and in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

They allege that respondent Ombudsman ignored evidence incriminatory to the raiders; that the receipts did not tally with petitioners' receipts nor with the Commission on Audit's inventory; that the respondents are guilty of robbery and of violating petitioners' constitutional right against violation of domicile. For these reasons, petitioners pray that the Ombudsman's resolution be reversed and that the Court direct the Ombudsman to cause the filing of criminal charges as may be warranted against respondents.

We find the petition in G.R. No. 111223 devoid of merit.

The Court, recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and for reasons of practicality, declared, in an En Banc resolution dated August 30, 1993, issued in G.R. Nos. 103446-47^[3] that the Court will not interfere nor pass upon findings of public respondent Ombudsman to avoid its being hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, and that it will not review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. The dismissal by the Ombudsman of petitioners' complaint, therefore, stands.

We will now discuss G.R. No. 104604.

Petitioners contend: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Collector of Customs could no longer order the seizure for the second time of items previously seized and released after amnesty payments of duties and taxes; (2) that the Bureau of Customs has lost jurisdiction to order the seizure of the items because the importation had ceased; (3) that the seizure of the items deprived the petitioners of their properties without due process of law; and (4) that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies.

We find no merit in petitioners' contentions.

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings^[4] The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.^[5]

It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.

The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.^[6]

Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.

"Respondents assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction between the existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the decisions the law has not seen fit to do so."^[7]

The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of the seizure should properly be ventilated before the Collector of Customs. We have had occasion to declare:

"The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance. (Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 10). The Collector of Customs of Sual-Dagupan in Seizure Identification No. 14-F-72 constituted itself as a tribunal to hear and determine among other things, the question of whether or not the M/V Lucky Star I was seized within the territorial waters of the Philippines. If the private respondents believe that the seizure was made outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, it should raise the same as a defense before the Collector of Customs and if not satisfied, follow the correct appellate procedures. A separate action before the Court of First Instance is not the remedy."^[8]

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104604 and in G.R. No. 111223 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, JJ., on official leave.

^[1] G.R. No. 104604, Rollo p. 21, Torres, ponente, Francisco and Santiago, JJ. concurring.

^[2] G.R. No. 111223, Rollo, p. 91.

^[3] Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725 (1993).

^[4] Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, 177 SCRA (1989).

^[5] General Travel Service v. David, G.R. No. L-19259, September 23, 1966, 18 SCRA 59; Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; De Joya v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893; Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, G.R. No. L-29043, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381; Collector of Customs v. Torres, G.R. No. L-22977, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 272; Pacis v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-24068, April 23, 1974, 56 SCRA 583; Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 264; Republic v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-35260, September 4, 1979, 93 SCRA 78; De la Fuente v. De Veyra, G.R. No. L-35385, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 451.

^[6] Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, supra.

^[7] Ponce Enrile v. Venuya, supra.

^[8] De la Fuente v. de Veyra, supra.

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